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# TOWARD A JIMP-CAPABLE LAND FORCE

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Mr. Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek

*The CF have to think and operate as a single entity with air, land and naval assets working as a joint team, both at home and abroad. They have to learn how to work even more closely with all of the elements that can help in achieving the Canadian government's objectives, as well as those of whatever international coalition we may choose to work with...This implies changes to the command and control mechanisms, to the way the CF equips and trains its teams, and even in the way they are educated and view the profession of arms within the larger political and social context in which they will have operate, both at home and overseas.*

**Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie: Chief of Land Staff,  
"Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the  
Canadian Forces" The 2004 Haycock Lecture,  
Canadian Military Journal, (Spring 2005).**

## Introduction

In today's security environment, successful military operations are unlikely to be achieved through the use of military power alone. In a world where conflict often involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and material drivers, an ability to bring to bear all instruments of national—and coalition—power and influence (e.g. diplomatic, economic, military, informational) on a problem in an effective, coordinated fashion is increasingly essential to achieving effective results. So too is an ability to address and, if possible, effectively harness the views and reactions of the public—both domestic and international, as well as the media, in support of operations as they unfold.

Canadian Forces (CF) acknowledgement of the need for a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident—and pressing. Accordingly, DND leadership—both civilian and military<sup>1</sup>—have increasingly called for the adoption of a force that is joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP)-enabled. Such a force would see diplomatic, defence, development and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan and applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would see traditional and non-traditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the "effects based approach to operations" (EBAO)<sup>2</sup> resulting in greater mission effectiveness.

Land force interest in such an approach is particularly strong. Indeed, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" or "JIMP-compliant" is now cited as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow (AoT) operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO)<sup>3</sup> and a key means to better ensure mission success in an ever more complex land environment.

Yet what precisely does it mean to be JIMP-capable? Why is this important in today's security environment? And how can such a capability be achieved?

The following discussion explores the opportunities and challenges that attend Land Force movement toward such an approach. More specifically, the paper:

◆ examines the meaning of JIMP and the rationale underlying movement toward a more JIMP-capable Army;

- ◆ the challenges and opportunities it presents; and
- ◆ the requirements that must be addressed to ensure its effectiveness. The discussion concludes by identifying a number of initiatives and actions that promise to facilitate movement toward a more JIMP-enabled land force.

## “JIMP—Capable” Definition, Rationale and Requirements

### Definition

In essence, the term JIMP is a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations) which inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place. To be “JIMP-capable” entails the adoption of an approach to operations, both domestic and international, that allows such players to effectively interact. Most importantly, it involves a belief in the requirement to adopt a comprehensive approach to problem solving that involves the holistic consideration—and, ideally the coordination of all relevant players.

A JIMP-capable organization involves both the development of a **framework** identifying key players and **capabilities** allowing for effective collaboration with those identified.

Indeed, a JIMP-capable force would interact with players in four domains:

- ◆ Joint<sup>4</sup>—involving other national military elements and support organizations.
- ◆ Interagency—involving other government departments (OGDs) and agencies (OGAs), both domestic and foreign (these agencies will include: host nation government




AR2006-A01-449a 30 Jan. 2006 PRT Sile Kandahar, Afghanistan Photo by Sgt Jerry Keam/DND

(First from Left) Mr. Robert Greenhill of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and (Sec from left) Superintendent Wayne Martin, Royal Canadian Mounted Police visit with Mr. Ross Heinz of Foreign Affairs Canada (FA), and Colonel Steve Bowes, Commander of the Provincial Reconstruction Team at Camp Nathan Smith, Afghanistan.

departments including security forces; government departments and agencies from support nations; and international government bodies, such as UN agencies).

- ◆ Multinational<sup>6</sup>—involving one or more allies or international coalition partners.
- ◆ Public—involving a variety of elements including: domestic and international publics, including host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public volunteer organizations (PVO), international organizations and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms recruited to support the government.

### Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP)



CF Operations must be viewed in a JIMP context, where a CF force package operates with the multinational and interagency partners to attain unity of purpose and effort in achieving desired effects, all while considering the requirements for public trust and support, both domestically and internationally. Public consent will confer legitimacy to the operation.

Figure 1: Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept, Draft 4.4, 21 May 2004, For CDS Review (Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2004), pp. 17-18.

Yet a JIMP—capable organization is also informed by a willingness to actively engage other players in each of these categories in a cooperative, collaborative relationship in pursuit of a desired end-state. And it is aware and cognizant of the potential impact that its actions have on other players and on the likelihood of achieving strategic objectives.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, what differentiates the broad JIMP environment from those interacting in a JIMP framework *is the reasonable expectation of co-operation* in a unity of purpose to achieve defined goals.

The JIMP construct is thus somewhat reflective of the “whole of government” and 3D+C (i.e. defence, diplomacy, development and commerce) philosophies articulated and advanced at the national level in recent international and defence policy statements.<sup>7</sup> In fact, JIMP further “disaggregates” many of the capabilities that these philosophies identify—more clearly specifying the various categories of players that they describe. And becoming JIMP-capable involves developing a capacity to interact with those in each in a cooperative, constructive manner.

### Rationale

CF interest in JIMP and more specifically, the capacity to be “JIMP-capable” thus reflects a growing belief in the importance of achieving greater interoperability and

collaboration among key players in the operational arena as well as in the development of the requisite networking capabilities and skills increasingly essential to achieving one's objectives.<sup>9</sup>



Combat Camera AR2006-G029-0067 22 October 2006 Kabul Afghanistan

**The Honourable Josée Verner, Minister of International Cooperation, and Minister for Official Languages and La Francophonie, today during her visit to Afghanistan announced three new investments, including two new projects to support the role of women and girls in society. She made the announcement during a meeting with the Afghan Ministers of Education and Women's Affairs at the Canadian Embassy in Kabul. During her visit the Minister was presented with a drawing picturing Afghan women and education.**

Yet even more fundamentally, support for the creation of JIMP-capability stems from a growing consensus that outward focused, integrated and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm to address the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment. That environment is increasingly dynamic, uncertain and challenging.

Often, it involves irregular and asymmetric conflict conducted by range of foes—including highly adaptive, media-savvy terrorist organizations intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding their will to fight; warlords seeking to retain power and influence over local populations at any price, and trans-national criminal organizations ready, willing and able to buy, sell and trade everything from drugs to armaments for their own gain. Often as well, it involves failed and failing states; whose tenuous existence and inability to meet popular demands offer ready breeding grounds for rebellion and civil war and a secure base from which adversaries can function. And, it involves complex human and physical terrain—with large, densely populated cities and highly diverse populations (e.g. ethnically, religiously, economically and culturally) often serving as the backdrop for military operations.

Increasingly, conflict zones are highly fluid and multidimensional. Battle lines are murky, with no clearly defined front or rear. Enemies are often dispersed over a wide geographical area. And, distinguishing friend from foe (or neutral) is difficult. Beyond this, conflict itself represents only part of the problem, as rampant civil disorder, famine and disease linger in the background and threaten societal collapse as well as the prospect of even more carnage to come. As such, efforts to address *these* dangers may well be as crucial to military success and the creation of stability as prevailing on the

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battlefield. In fact, future conflict is likely to be as much about winning “hearts and minds” and gaining legitimacy among surrounding populations as engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries.

The upshot of such a world is greater complexity—both in terms of the causes of instability and in terms of the solutions required to address it. It also suggests that addressing future challenges may well involve a wider range of personnel, skill-sets and resources than ever before. To be sure, traditional reliance on military power will often provide one component of the solutions required. Yet the prospective role(s) and the relative importance of the military and of other organizations in providing lasting solutions will nonetheless vary—both from case to case as well as within each case that arises. So also will their need to interact, cooperate and collaborate with a range of players if solutions pursued are to be lasting and effective.

The JIMP concept reflects an implicit recognition of the CF’s need to address such realities. In fact, it is critical in order to balance the requirement to be able to fight and win in war—the CF’s fundamental role—with the need also to be able to undertake a wide range of operations other than war (OOTW).

By attempting to better enable collaboration and cooperation between the military and other—often non-military, and civilian organizations and interests—JIMP promises to increase the likelihood that the information skills and resources needed to address the problems and challenges that the complex security environment raises will be available and effectively brought to bear. Such interaction would promise to increase the quantity, quality and types of information available to commanders, thereby increasing situational awareness. It would help sensitize players to a variety of viewpoints and variables at work within an operation as well as a number of potential second and third order effects which their actions may yield. And, it would help to better ensure that the actions of the military as well as those of other players are better coordinated in support of broader mission goals and objectives. Indeed, it promises to make decisions and actions more “strategic” in character.

Most importantly, a JIMP capability *could* serve, over time, to better socialize both the military and other organizations within the JIMP environment to the varied demands of the security environment itself and the important contributions which each can, and should, make in addressing its challenges. The result would be a clearer understanding, respect and appreciation of the assets which varied players bring to the table in addressing security challenges, a willingness to cooperate with these players if and when possible, and to defer to others in reaching such goals—when circumstances warrant. In short, it would serve to generate a more “holistic” view of security and how to achieve it.

## Requirements

To be sure, realizing such an integrated, “holistic” approach to operations is challenging. For the military alone, the demands that realization of a JIMP-capability would involve are numerous. The initiatives required will likely include:

- ◆ The adoption of a ‘team’ approach to develop an integrated campaign plan in order to realize its operational objectives in full spectrum operations.
- ◆ Creation of an ability to immediately plug into joint battle space operating systems to interoperate effectively.
- ◆ The capacity to access key information in an efficient timely manner—so as to identify targets for attack and influence as well as determine JIMP resources required in operations.



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- ◆ The willingness to consider second and third order effects in its planning process.
- ◆ An ability to facilitate the building of interagency and multinational interoperability through collaborative planning mechanisms and protocols.
- ◆ An ability to connect non-governmental agencies with CF operational architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission.
- ◆ The ability to implement effective communication with joint and other multinational agencies. (This also would include the ability to provide an efficient interface between conventional and special forces).
- ◆ An ability to clearly and effectively communicate mission goals, objectives and actions to the public and members of the media as *required*.

Add to this the diversity of organizations and agencies that inhabit the JIMP environment—each with its own culture, mindset, biases and capabilities, along with the need to connect with publics in a clear, constructive manner—and the challenge of devising a truly effective JIMP approach to operations is doubly challenging. The fact that the effectiveness and credibility of some organizations—particularly certain NGOs—can be seriously compromised if they are perceived as working with military organizations only compounds problems.

Such dilemmas suggest that establishing goals for the development of an effective JIMP capability must be measured and realistic. In particular, they must be based on a recognition that the involvement of certain organizations and players within of the JIMP environment can, and will, vary. So too will the character and quality of the relationships and interactions that ultimately occur. In fact, possession of JIMP-capabilities by military organizations cannot, in and of themselves, guarantee that an effective JIMP approach will always be followed (result). Rather, both the *capability* and *willingness* of other

organizations and players to engage in a cooperative relationship is essential. And that in turn will often be somewhat dependent on the character of the players involved, as well as their own resources, agendas and goals.

Still, the creation of a JIMP capability can help to increase prospects that such interactions not only occur but that they are also cooperative, constructive and useful—not only to the military, but to all those involved. Indeed, while the creation of a JIMP capable organization *cannot* bring all players to the table, *it can* at least ensure that the possibility (option) to link is present for those willing to participate, and that the linkages and interactions that occur are as effective and valuable as possible. Beyond this, it can increase prospects that all concerns of JIMP participants are considered and addressed in the CF decision-making process.

## Efforts at Implementation

Certainly, CF and Land Force interest in a JIMP approach is not without precedent. In fact, efforts to practice a more “JIMP-oriented” approach to operations are currently underway. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan offer a case in point. Over the course of Western involvement, coalition allies have combined counterinsurgency operations involving special forces and regular infantry with broader efforts aimed at stabilization and reconstruction of the country. Military, diplomatic, development and law enforcement personnel are in fact working together in a relatively collaborative, cooperative framework to help realize the Afghanistan National Strategy (ANS) and thus bring stability, prosperity and good governance to the country.<sup>9</sup>

Within this context, new forms of military organization called provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) have emerged and are undertaking stability and reconstruction tasks. First established in early 2003, PRT’s consisted of sixty to one hundred soldiers plus, eventually, Afghan advisors and representatives from agencies such as foreign affairs and international aid and development agencies. PRTs have the potential to become a model for future stabilization and reconstruction efforts.<sup>10</sup>



Combat Camera AR2006-M011-0033 22 Nov 06 Kandahar, Afghanistan

Visit to the Shaheed Abdul Ahad Khan Orphanage in Kandahar City to drop off items donated by the Assistance to Afghanistan Fund. PRT medical technician Cpl Ashley Brace, speaking through an interpreter, instructs an orphanage worker on care for a child who injured her foot playing, after he finished cleaning and dressing the injury.

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Today, there exist approximately 24 PRT's from 13 countries operating in Afghanistan. "They have played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to disarmament and mediating factional conflicts."<sup>11</sup> Although PRT's are not without their problems, including inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities and ad hoc preparation, PRT's provide a good starting point for developing tools to achieve JIMP success in future security missions.

The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) also assumes a range of tasks that encompass JIMP contributors. Formed in 1996 after the Canadian Government recognised the need for a rapid response capability to provide effective humanitarian aid, DART extends the CF's 'warfighting' training regime,<sup>12</sup> by tasking it to provide humanitarian assistance in response to both natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies. Today, the CF has about 200 personnel ready to deploy in forty-eight hours to any location in the world.

Such organizations are illustrative of nascent JIMP capability within the CF. Neither has a warfighting focus as a primary function.<sup>13</sup> And perceptions of their growing utility increasingly suggest that the traditional understandings of warfighting as the dominant paradigm for armed forces is shifting as tasks once considered "sideshows" are now occupying "centre stage."


That said, much more remains to be done if JIMP capabilities are to be firmly institutionalized. Indeed, a truly JIMP-capable force will require: the elaboration and eventual codification of JIMP procedures, protocols, and standards of "best practice"; the creation of training and education programs for effective JIMP operations (including the possibility of training in the establishment of effective governance), some determination of the level at which JIMP activities are best integrated into operations (e.g. task force, battalion, etc.), an identification of the conditions which must be satisfied for operating with NGOs in the field, and; some idea of how best to develop effective communication strategies for dealing with the public and media as operations unfold.

Beyond this, the human and technological networks that an effective JIMP capability involves must be further elaborated—with initiatives to identify and inventory the individuals, organizations and agencies likely to be of importance—perhaps serving as an important first step in developing a truly capable and collaborative JIMP approach to security threats and challenges in the years to come.<sup>14</sup>

## **Toward a JIMP-Capable Land Force**

To be sure, JIMP is a broad concept and is beyond the sole purview of the Land Force. The CF as a whole represents but one JIMP player among many. However, it is within the Land Force, and especially its AoT conceptual construct, that efforts to operationalize JIMP have received particularly detailed attention and expression. Indeed, Land Futures of the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine (DLCD) has recognized the importance of JIMP as an enabling concept<sup>15</sup> both for the CF and the Land Force. And initial analysis clearly suggests grounds for cautious optimism.

In fact, when broken down into its component parts, it is clear that the ideas underpinning JIMP are not particularly novel. The joint and multinational aspects of JIMP are already well established—both within the continental general staff system and in the Canadian practice of staff responsibilities.<sup>16</sup> And while the interagency and public components pose greater challenges for the Land Force—most notably in terms of interfacing with entities that are essentially non-military in nature and have well-established cultures, some experience is nonetheless resident in past civil military cooperation (CIMIC) practice.<sup>17</sup> Ever since the creation of civil affairs units established within the US military during WWII, civil military coordination (CIMIC) has been considered a force multiplier<sup>18</sup> for commanders. CIMIC, a wholly reserve function within



**Figure 2: National Defence, Chief of Land Staff, Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, B-GL-355-001/FP-001, 2006-03-01: 4.**

the Land Force, provides an institutionalized foundation from which the JIMP concept, in particular the interagency and public components, can evolve (see Figure 2).

With the nascent foundations for JIMP already in place, (i.e. the continental staff system and CIMIC), further development of JIMP as an enabling concept can proceed.

Within the Land Force, this is undertaken through the Land Force Capability Development<sup>19</sup> process and use of the Land Force Capability Development Continuum. The continuum consists of four pillars—conceive, design, build and manage—of which the capability development process is encapsulated in the first three. Each has a lead agency appointed to discipline, analyze and record the documentation necessary to guide the capability through to realization. Moreover, the work performed within each pillar sets the foundation and conditions for subsequent, iterative or spiral activity.

Land Futures, the lead agency for the AoT and the JIMP enabling concept, focuses its activities within the “conceive” pillar. And the research performed to establish the foundation and conditions for future work is articulated through a PRICIE<sup>20</sup> analysis—which provides a structured approach to identifying new Land Force capabilities and/or deficiencies and provides a process to design conceptual structures.

In terms of the JIMP concept, a “conceive” PRICIE analysis yields a number of insights in a range of key categories.

### **Personnel, Leadership and Individual Training**

**Personnel.** As noted by Christopher Ankersen, “. . . human capital is a key component in developing defence capability.”<sup>21</sup> This point has not gone unnoticed by the Land Futures staff in the development of a JIMP capable AoT. However, although one would immediately assume that military personnel are the sole focus of the JIMP concept; this has not been the case. Land Forces are more familiar with the joint and multinational components but less familiar with interagency and public components and

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there has been clear recognition that the interagency and public components of JIMP cut across many cultures and organizations. Although there is no tolerance for military parochial viewpoints in the development of a JIMP concept, it is understood that there is little the CF can do to prevent parochial positions from other JIMP contributors. What is important to recognize at this point is that within the emerging security environment, status quo attitudes that reflect the total subversion of other JIMP contributors, in particular interagency and public, to the defence agenda will not suffice. This is not to degrade or downplay the importance of the security function within that environment, but rather a recognition that in conflict zones of the future, there will be many more players, inside and out side Canada's "whole of government approach", whose agendas may not necessarily coincide with that of the military's.<sup>22</sup>

The Land Force personnel who best represent the JIMP capability at present—especially the interagency and public components—are those within the CIMIC specialty.<sup>23</sup> The fact that the reserves singularly execute this function within the Land Force has not gone unnoticed. There is both promise (broad mix of civilian capabilities) and peril (sustainment of operations) associated with the reserves solely undertaking this function; however, current thinking within the CIMIC Directorate is a preference for "full-time" staff with little regard to whether the person is reserve or regular force.<sup>24</sup> Historically, there has existed a cultural divide between the reserves and regular force that continues to exist in various forms today. Much of this divide involves issues of trust. This has obvious implications with the reserves filling a function believed to be a key enabler in the emerging security environment. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that when the two forces are brought together for operations, the necessary levels of trust emerge between the commander and staff regardless of whether the soldier is regular or reserve force.<sup>25</sup> The fact that the reserves have been able to fulfill this task is good news for the CF as they continue to face shortfalls in certain occupations and challenges related to human resource planning and retention.<sup>26</sup> In fact, this issue supports a view expressed by some that the CF are not leveraging the reserves to their full capacity and that they may provide more cost effective investments to increasing CF capacity.<sup>27</sup>

As noted above, human capital is the key to developing a JIMP capability within the Land Force. Although CIMIC informs the JIMP concept and represents the more difficult aspects, the interagency and public components, it does not wholly represent the JIMP capability, which is more holistic in nature as described above. However, the full-time CIMIC capability currently resident within the CF represents an institutionalized structure from which the CF can build a part of its JIMP capability. From an AoT perspective, the reserves offer the specialty roles and capabilities associated with civilian qualifications, as well as the expertise relevant to establishing a more robust JIMP capability in the future operating environment.<sup>28</sup>

**Leadership.** Army leadership is fundamental to the development of force employment concepts.<sup>29</sup> The direction to conduct a separate line of investigation concerning a JIMP capability for the AoT signals recognition by Army leadership of the importance of this function within the emerging security environment. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of the JIMP concept anticipated in that context relates directly to the current GoC's "whole of government" approach and the CF's focus on the "Three Block War." CF CIMIC policy highlights the importance of this capability in current operations:

In contemporary CF operations, civil-military relations have become increasingly complex and the degree of interaction required between deployed forces and civil actors is now significant. Likewise, civil actors have a great impact upon the conduct and successful outcome of CF operations. As a result, effective

coordination of information and activities between deployed forces and civil actors is now a key element to the success of CF operations.

Although civil military cooperation has existed in military operations for several years, the conduct of modern military operations is constantly changing and evolving. As part of this change, it is now recognized that the civilian environment in which military operations take place, must be considered in everything the CF does. A robust CIMIC capability is required to ensure that the intentions and actions of civil actors are coordinated with military intentions. This policy is intended to be the foundation for the development of the CF CIMIC function and capability.<sup>30</sup>



Combat Camera DSC000916 Photo by Capt Edward Stewart

Major Erin Savage, Officer Commanding, Health Service Support Company (HSS Coy), 1 Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group (1 RCR BG) shows Afghan children the photograph she just took of them. Elements of HSS Coy travelled to various villages west of Kandahar Airfield (KAF) to conduct a Village Medical Outreach (VMO)

If we return to CIMIC as the institutional foundation for a JIMP capability, the importance of leadership may be articulated as follows:

CIMIC, whether domestic or international, is a *command responsibility* and requires *leadership* from the highest military appointments in cooperation with the heads of civilian agencies.<sup>31</sup>

As such, the successful implementation of a JIMP concept will require continued active endorsement from CF and Army leadership as well as other GoC departments.

**Individual Training.** Adaptive dispersed operations, the foundation of AoT, demand that every soldier be a JIMP contributor. Today, we are witness to the genesis of this concept through the “Three Block War” and “Whole of Government” approach. As such, it would be prudent for the Army and CF to address the pervasiveness of the JIMP concept for the AoT through an appropriate and effective regime of individual training. Reaching down to the individual level of training will provide the necessary foundation for the establishment of a JIMP capability. To a certain degree, it is understood that many of the JIMP concepts already exist within the current Army training system;

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however, it is recommended that the JIMP concept be driven down further—i.e. to the Basic Individual and Training and Education level as outlined in DAOD 5031-2,<sup>32</sup> thereby highlighting its importance.

From a philosophical standpoint, there is considerable literature and research which concludes that soldiers, in response to what are called “new wars”,<sup>33</sup> are taking on greater non-warfighting functions that seem at odds with their traditional warfighting roles (i.e. policing and development projects). Although it is not the intent to examine this debate here, it should be noted that this idea fits neatly within the “Three Block War” construct as well as the recent development of a CF PRTs and is perhaps an indication of things to come.

## **Research and Development (R&D) and Operational Research (OR)**

**Research and Development.** Thrust advisory groups (TAG) exist for each of the operational functions—command, sense, act, shield and sustain. TAGs are well suited to address R&D issues surrounding a JIMP concept. For example, building “trust” between different “cultures”, be they within the CF, GoC departments, or NGOs, is a critical prerequisite for the emergence of an effective JIMP concept. This is in fact a current command TAG experiment being conducted at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto which currently has a CF focus but has the potential for expansion to incorporate the broad range of JIMP contributors.

**Operational Research.** The significance of OR and its success in support of commanders is well documented. OR support to Army commanders extends as far back as Vimy Ridge (1917) and includes current operations in Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> As such, it is anticipated that OR will support research focused on the JIMP concept. For example, Army Experiment 9A recently exercised, in part, the JIMP concept within a warfighting context. And examination of the JIMP concept in a peace support operation, a humanitarian crisis or in a disaster assistance response context—both international and domestic—is being considered for future Army Experiments within a synthetic environment. Furthermore, consideration is being given to implementing an OR team within the AoT experimental battle group set to commence in the summer of 2007.

## **Infrastructure, Environment and Organization**

The AoT construct does not envisage major infrastructure changes to further the JIMP concept. As mentioned earlier, the continental staff system and the CIMIC specialty provide the institutional foundations to build a JIMP capability. Viewed primarily as a holistic approach to operations, the chief focus of JIMP is on inculcating a new approach to operations primarily involving new agencies and publics while retaining and indeed improving joint and multinational collaboration and cooperation in both warfighting and stability and reconstruction operations. However, while it is anticipated that interagency and public organizations will become more closely integrated into a force structure it expected that they will be non-permanent structures. Further, it is anticipated that liaison officers (LOs) in support of the JIMP concept (i.e. LOs to other agencies and publics) will become increasingly important and more numerous.<sup>35</sup> The increased importance of the JIMP capability and LOs can be viewed within the latest designs for current battle group and brigade headquarter structures (see Figures 3 and 4). Moving to a fully JIMP capable headquarters will constitute an evolutionary step from the structures illustrated below (permanent JIMP capabilities outlined in red with non-permanent in yellow box).

## **Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training**

**Concepts and Doctrine.** As mentioned above, the JIMP concept is not entirely new to the CF. Joint and multinational aspects have been with us for some time and




FIGURE 3: Director Army Doctrine, BDE and BG Structures 11 Oct 06, viewed 17 Nov 2006, <[http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03\\_CDR/03\\_CDR\\_Active/06004\\_Command/CDR](http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03_CDR/03_CDR_Active/06004_Command/CDR)>.




FIGURE 4: Director Army Doctrine, BDE and BG Structures 11 Oct 06, viewed 17 Nov 2006, <[http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03\\_CDR/03\\_CDR\\_Active/06004\\_Command/CDR](http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/dglcd/files/03_CDR/03_CDR_Active/06004_Command/CDR)>.

resident with the continental staff system. For future development, it is recommended that the continental staff system be retained to adequately represent the joint and multinational aspects of the JIMP concept.

Interagency and public aspects of the JIMP concept have been evident within CIMIC doctrine. The real change, however, is the increased emphasis of the interagency and

public aspects in the contemporary operating environment and the future security environment. This is largely based on recognition that stability and reconstruction are now as important as warfighting within these contexts—particularly in light the range of challenges associated with failing and failed state phenomena. Here, while our current tactical CIMIC doctrine is sound, the operational level requires revision. In fact such revision may provide the backbone for future JIMP concept doctrine development.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs<sup>36</sup> inform the JIMP concept as they bring together the military (including CIMIC), agencies and publics under a single construct in a conflict zone. Although there are many lessons which still must be learned from this new type of unit, the PRT can be seen as representative of the next iterative step for both brigade and battle group structures incorporating political, developmental and other JIMP players (i.e. RCMP, Corrections Canada, NGOs, etc.) on a permanent or non-permanent basis. Although the core PRT structure illustrated below is a US model, it highlights the interagency and publics perspectives of the JIMP concept (outlined in red) and their position within the unit.

## PRT Core Task Organization




FIGURE 5: US Aid, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, viewed 17 Nov 2006 <[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADG252.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf)>: 28.

**Collective Training.** The required pervasiveness of the JIMP concept throughout the CF is important and can be achieved to a certain degree through individual training and education initiatives specifically aimed at highlighting its significance for the current Army and the AoT. However, higher-level formation and general staff training must be achieved through collective training. Collective training must incorporate OGDs, IOs, NGOs and PVOs to inculcate coordination aspects of the JIMP concept such as collaborative planning. An ability to integrate the above agencies into the operational architecture and provide liaison to support them is crucial for JIMP success.

### Information Management and Information Technology

Information management and technology will be a “crucial” aspect of JIMP-enabled HQs. Security protocols resident within the CF as well as other agencies will require careful study to enable an adequate functioning of the JIMP concept (i.e. access to key information). An immediate “plug and play” capability in the JIMP environment will be required to interoperate quickly and effectively. And all agencies will require communications utilizing the latest technological advancements.

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## Equipment and Support


At this time, it is anticipated that the major capital requirement to support a JIMP concept will reside within the information management and technology realms; namely communications equipment.

## Conclusion

JIMP is a concept that will have a considerable impact within the emerging security environment. Although primarily holistic in nature, JIMP articulates a perspective of operations which until recently has been regarded as being of **secondary** importance to the military. Yet times are changing. In parallel with the US's declaration that conventional warfighting operations and stability and reconstruction operations are equally "decisive",<sup>37</sup> the GoC has endorsed "Whole of Government" and 3D+C philosophies whereby the security mission is no longer the sole purview of military forces. The nature of operations today and in the future will resemble the "Three Block War" construct—a construct which demands that soldiers interact with many different players other than their own armed forces and undertake non-traditional tasks. This is in fact a new norm for the Army. It is also a norm that reflects the dynamics of the current and future security environments.

Although there remain many issues to be researched and discussed with respect to a JIMP-capable army, three broad areas require particular attention:

◆ **Security.** A JIMP-capable army does not imply an abrogation of its security function. Rather, it implies recognition that the future security environment is much more complex—with an increasingly varied number of players interacting within it. Indeed a range of players can contribute to the security function. Further, decisive operations do not equate exclusively with warfighting. Increasingly, stability and reconstruction tasks are of equal importance. It is perhaps the US that has led the way in institutionalizing this concept. In fact it is reflected in US Presidential Order No. 44 as well as in current



KA2004-R-103-1193d 26 May 2004 Kabul Afghanistan Photo by Cpl John Bradley

Mr. Christopher Alexander, the Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, meets senior fire officials at the opening of a refurbished fire hall in the Khoshal Khan Meena district of Kabul, Afghanistan. The project was a joint effort between the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) section of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion Royal 22<sup>nd</sup> Regiment Battalion Group (3 R22<sup>nd</sup> R Bn Gp), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

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Army capstone doctrine. Within the Canadian Army, the evolution of the DART and PRT, along with recent recommended changes to BG and Bde HQ structures (including CIMIC) provides the foundation from which a JIMP capability for the Army can be further developed and institutionalized.

◆ **Coordination and Networking.** A JIMP-capable army requires a robust coordination and networking function. Although there is a general perception that the military will attempt to control the agenda through its robust communications infrastructure and coordination capabilities, this is simply not the case. Within the emerging security environment, there will be few organizations, if any, equipped as well as a military force to sponsor this critical function. As such, the Army must be equipped and trained to support a broad coordination and networking function with NGOs, IOs, OGDs, coalition forces and, potentially, host nation publics. The necessity of this function also highlights the importance of enabling concepts—such as the network—and of networking technology to support effective and robust communications with JIMP contributors.

◆ **Consequence Management.** A JIMP-capable army will also be expected to conduct efficient consequence management. Although there is no official definition of this term, the AoT must be ready to systematically take action in the face of life threatening or destructive events. As such, JIMP contributor roles, responsibilities and plans must be identified and a clearly defined response channel set up. From battle damage to infrastructure destruction to the deaths of innocent bystanders, a JIMP-capable army must be ready to react alone or in concert with other JIMP contributors. A lack of ability in this domain will allow opposing forces to seize the initiative and exploit events to their own benefit.

To be sure, the creation of an effective and truly holistic JIMP capability will pose a range of challenges. Yet initiatives in the three broad areas outlined above are especially important. Only then will JIMP represent a truly effective means for coping with the increasingly complex challenges likely to characterize the security environment in the years ahead.

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## About the Authors...

Peter Gizewski is a Defence Scientist/Strategic Analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada—Center for Operational Research and Analysis, Ottawa. For the past four years, he has served with the Army's Directorate of Land Capability Development, Land Futures Unit, in Kingston, Ontario.

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek joined the Canadian Forces in 1979 by way of Le College militaire royal de Saint-Jean. In 1984, he graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada with a Bachelor of Arts (Commerce) and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. Upon completion of armoured training in 1985 he became a member of The Royal Canadian Dragoons stationed in Lahr, West Germany. He has held a variety of command and staff appointments as well as various school and training positions. He was promoted to his current rank in 1999 and has served as Directing Staff at both the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra. He holds two Master's degrees - a Master's of Arts (Defence Management and Policy), Royal Military College and a Master's of Management in Defence Studies, University of Canberra, Australia. He is currently completing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College while employed as a Staff Officer in the Land Futures section within Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine.

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## Endnotes

1. Department of National Defence interest in JIMP has been evident in early drafts of the Strategic Operating Concept, See, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept*, Draft 4.4, 21 May 2004, For CDS Review (Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2004). See especially pp. 17-18. And the Canadian Forces Experimentation Center lists JIMP in its Glossary of Terms. Nor is interest in such an approach confined only to Canada. In fact similar calls have been echoed in NATO circles. Speaking at a NATO meeting in 2004 Dr. John Leggat—former